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Abstract
The selective retention hypothesis states that people tend to 
remember information which is consistent with their attitudes and 
forget information which is contrary to their attitudes. This 
hypothesis has been shown to depend upon such factors as the sex 
of the subject, ego-involvement, the function that learning the 
material may serve for the subject, the nature of the audience to 
whom one must communicate, the affective nature of the material, 
prior familiarity with the material, and the cognitive structure 
of the subject.
The present study is an attempt to further explore the role of 
affective material and cognitive structure as these variables affect 
selective retention. The affective material used consisted of 
favorable, neutral, and unfavorable statements about men and women 
which were given to 48 male and 48 female college students in a 
recognition memory task. The subjects had been selected on the 
basis of their scores on an attitude measure, the Attitude Toward 
Women Scale (AWS), and placed into liberal, moderate, and conservative 
groups. The AWS is an instrument which measures attitudes towards the 
role of women in society along a liberal— conservative dimension.
Subject’s performance on the recognition memory task was measured 
utilizing the signal detection model as it has been applied to memory. 
The dependent variables were d’ (d prime, which is the measure of
ix
retention provided by signal detection theory), percent correct, 
and § (beta, which is a measure of the subject’s tendency to respond 
to tt a memory items ir; a biased manner by selecting one response cate­
gory tore often than another). {} is also derived from signal detection 
theory These measures were subjected to a four-way analysis of vari­
ance with repeated measures on two variables. The independent variables 
were se: of subject (male-female), attitude of subject (liberal, moderate, 
conserva tive), sex of statement (male-female), and favorability of state­
ment (favorable, neutral, unfavorable). Repeated measures were obtained 
on the sex of statement and favorability of statement variables.
The results showed no differences in memory due to the sex of the 
subject or the sex of the statement. Attitude did affect memory per- 
formance between subjects who were moderate and liberal in their atti- 
tude towards women with the liberal subjects remembering significantly 
more item; than the moderates. This effect was consistent for both d' 
and percsi t correct. There was also a tendency for the more favorable 
items to be remembered better than the more unfavorable items. The 
results for $ tended to show that as the items became more favorable 
subjects adopted a stricter criterion which means they tended to deny 
having s<en the items before.
The results provide support for the selective retention of state­
ments about men and women by subjects who differ in their attitudes 
toward women along a liberal-conservative dimension. These results 
were net affected by the affective nature of che material. The results 
for H :ould not be interpreted.
x
CHAPTER I
Introduction and Literature Review
Levine and Murphy (1943) reported a study in the Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology which showed that the learning and 
forgetting of controversial material was a function of the subject's 
attitude toward that material. Their subjects learned and remembered 
arguments which were congruent with their attitudes better than 
arguments which were incongruent with their attitudes. Intuitively 
this relationship seemed so unquestionable it led Greaves (1972) to 
state . .it appeared that this was just another case of what 
anthropologist Ashley Montague once called 'psychology's struggle 
to prove the obvious"' (p. 327).
This relationship between attitudes and memory for certain kinds 
of information has become known as the selective retention hypothesis 
and, contrary to what Montague said, it has not. proven to be all that 
"obvious." It has been shown to be subject to a number of limitations.
Along another vein, it can be said that as the science of psy­
chology has advanced new theoretical and methodological developments 
have been applied to "old" problems. In this paper the "old" problem 
is selective retention and the "new" development is the application 
of signal detection theory to obtain a measure of retention which is 
bias free, that is, a measure of the strength of the memory trace 
which is separated from the subject's willingness or unwillingness to
respond "yes" or "no" to a given memory item. Both of these factors 
will affect performance.
Upmeyer and Layer (1973) suggested in their review of existing 
theories explaining the impact of attitudes on memory that "Contra­
dictory results from earlier studies should be explained by a stimulus 
processing theory which separates the subjective analysis of stimuli 
from the choice of responses" (p. 181). They argued for a signal 
detection model to do this.
The attitude under investigation in the present study is the 
attitude of men and women towards women’s roles in society. Under 
the impetus of the Women’s Liberation Movement the traditional views 
of how women should behave have been seriously challenged. Yet, the 
general population has far from agreed with or accepted these ideas.
The question of interest in this study is whether differences 
in attitudes towards women affect the remembering of affective material 
about men and women, namely favorable, neutral or unfavorable state­
ments about the same or opposite sex.
In approaching this problem, it is convenient to divide the liter­
ature review into four sections: studies on selective retention, 
studies of sex differences in memory, a description of the Attitude 
Towards Women Scale (AWS) used to assess attitudes, and the Theory of 
Signal Detection.
Impact of Attitude on Remembering
The selective retention hypothesis has appeared in the psychological 
literature since psychology's early beginnings. William James emphasized 
that people will selectively attend to information they find appealing 
and Freud believed that people will selectively forget, or repress, 
certain painful material.
The early research on selective retention seemed to show rather 
conclusively that the relationship was a "real" one. Watson and 
Hartman (1939) studied the ability of theists and atheists to recall 
arguments in favor of or against religion and found their subjects 
tended to recall statements which supported their position. Edwards 
(1941) hypothesized: "Experiences which hairmonize with an existing 
frame of reference will tend to be learned and remembered better than 
experiences which conflict with the same frame of reference" (p. 36). 
Subjects heard a speech about the New Deal and Communism and were given 
a recognition test which consisted of 50 T-F items about the passage 
(these items had been judged by six judges to be pro- or anti-New 
Deal). Subjects’ attitudes were assessed prior to the speech and 
three groups were formed— favorable, neutral and anti-New Deal groups. 
He found that subjects with pro-New Deal attitudes viewed the speeches 
and the content favorably whereas subjects whose attitudes were un­
favorable to the New Deal regarded the speech and content unfavorably. 
Recognition of material for both the pro- and anti-group was in harmony 
with their attitudes and errors tended to occur on items which were 
contrary to their attitudes.
Levine and Murphy (1943) investigated the learning and forgetting 
of pro- and anti-Communist material. They asked 5 pro-Communist and 
5 anti-Communist students (known by their reputation on campus) to 
read and reproduce the same two passages on 5 different occasions, 
each a week apart. During each "reproduction" session JS was asked to 
reproduce as much of the two passages as he could remember. At each 
reproduction session, subjects recalled more information from the 
material favoring their position than from the material opposing it.
Alper and Korchin (1952) studied whether attitude toward men and 
women students affected memory for pro- or anti-male and female items. 
They used a controversial passage which was derogatory towards women 
and which described the merits of male or female university students.
The passage consisted of pro- and anti-male and female statements.
Recall was tested using serial and successive reproduction. They 
found, with the method of successive reproduction, that male S£ con­
sistently retained more material than women Ss except when that 
material was unfavorable to men, in which case women remembered more 
anti-male items. In explaining the failure of women to recall as 
many items overall as men the authors state:
Since, in our society, women actually do not have equal 
status with men, the derogatory tenor of the passage 
may well have aroused insecurity feelings in college 
women. . . .  It is a fact that threat lowers performance 
level. Too much ego-involvement can be temporarily dis­
organizing (p. 33).
The authors state that women's tendency to remember anti-male items
may actually be a case of selective retention.
Selective retention of such items by women could perform 
a different function. On the one hand, emphasis on anti­
male items transforms a generally anti-female passage 
into one which is both anti-male and anti-female. The 
anti-female impact of the passage would thereby be 
lessened. On the other hand, the greater recall of anti­
male items could function as an outlet for aggression 
(p. 33).
The authors also indicate that females' protocols contained more distor­
tions and exaggerations than males', particularly of the anti-female 
statements, and comment:
They make such items even more anti-female than the pas­
sage itself. This self-abasive tendency, along with the 
poorer overall recall, is interpreted to mean that female 
Ss in our society feel more threatened by the content of 
the passage than do male Sis, that female jS£ accept the 
cultural stereotype of their inferiority and reinforce it 
by keeping it in the focus of their attention (p. 36).
5Taft (1954) tested the selective retention hypothesis in a study 
similar to Alper and Korchin (1952) only their subjects were white 
and black delinquent boys. Taft’s memory task consisted of a passage 
about a Negro baseball player which contained favorable, unfavorable, 
and neutral items about Negroes. (There were no blacks in the major 
leagues when the data were gathered so the material was considered 
ego-involving for the blacks.) They found that blacks recalled more 
items than whites, particularly the items that were favorable to 
them. Both groups recalled favorable items better than unfavorable 
items and ambiguous items best of all. In delayed recall three days 
later blacks* superiority in recall increased, particularly for 
favorable items. Blacks tended to forget unfavorable items as tested 
by delayed recall whereas whites forgot unfavorable items the least. 
Taft argued "The art of recall and forgetting should be considered 
from a functional point of view, i.e., in terms of the function which 
it performs for the organism" (p. 27). This explanation is fitting 
for this situation since E was a white, authoritarian figure perhaps 
sensitizing and alerting blacks to the emotionally toned items.
When, three days later, the threatening situation no longer existed, 
the defensive function became more apparent in the selective forget­
ting by blacks of unfavorable items about blacks. Taft further 
states:
All we can hypothesize ahead of time is that ego-involving 
factors will make a difference but we do not know enough 
yet about human behavior to predict for any group of Ss in 
any given circumstances whether positive and negative ego 
involvement will lead to sensitization or repression (p. 27, 
emphasis in original).
A study by Jones and Aneshansel (1956) provides further evidence 
for the effect of attitude on memory. They attempted to establish
6the conditions under which subjects who disagreed with a set of state­
ments would learn those statements better than subjects who agreed 
with them. They focused on the integration question with students 
in a southern university who agreed with or were opposed to integra­
tion. All subjects were given a list of 11 anti-segregation state­
ments to read out loud and then reproduce. Two different sets of 
instructions were used and one-half of the subjects received each 
set of instructions. One group was told to read the statements and 
reproduce them. They were given no further instructions. This group 
showed that on each of 5 trials the anti-segregation subjects repro­
duced more statements than the pro-segregation subjects, a result 
which supports the selective retention hypothesis. The second half 
of the subjects were given instructions to think up counter-arguments 
for controversial statements. They were told that they would be 
presented, at a later time, with pro-segregation statements and that 
their task would be to look at each statement and provide a counter­
argument. First of all, though, a list of 11 anti-segregation state­
ments that could be used as counter-arguments was shown to them and 
they were to learn the3e statements as quickly as possible. The re­
sults showed the pro-segregation subjects actually learned more items 
than did anti-segregation subjects, even though the statements opposed 
their beliefs. Jones and Gerard (1967) in reviewing this study com­
mented :
This experiment shows a counterpart to vigilance in the 
perception of threatening or negatively toned stimuli.
It suggests one kind of restriction on the general hypoth­
esis that persons always learn best those statements that 
they favor. Although this may usually be true, it is 
necessary to consider the situation in which learning 
takes place and the effects of this situation in arousing 
motives that enhance or impede learning (p. 247).
7Jones and Kohler (1958) identified a further restriction of the 
selective learning hypothesis. They used anti-segregation statements 
similar to those used by Jones and Aneshansel (1956) and were able to 
show that subjects learned plausible statements favoring their overall 
position better than they learned implausible statements. This re­
sult supports the conclusion of Levine and Murphy (1943) that attitude 
influences learning and memory. However, it was also known that sub­
jects learned implausible statements about the opposing position much 
better than they learned plausible statements favoring that position. 
These results tend to show that attitudes affect memory of material 
when that material can be used to defend or maintain one's position.
Another study which has lent support to the selective learning 
hypothesis was done by Zimmerman and Bauer (1956). They explored 
another determinant of recall— the effect of an audience to which one 
must communicate an opinion. The hypothesis they set out to test was 
that "material which was incongruent with the imagined attitudes of a 
prospective audience would be remembered less well than material 
which was congruent with these imagined attitudes" (p. 240). Two 
sets of arguments pertaining to teachers' salaries were composed; 
one was in favor of raising salaries, the other was opposed. Subjects 
were led to believe they would be talking to an audience about teacher's 
salaries. Some subjects were told the audience would be the National 
Council of Teachers (supposedly interested in raising teachers' sala­
ries) and others were told the audience would be the American Taxpayers 
Economy League (supposedly against raising salaries). II then read a 
series of statements that would help jS in writing his speech. After 
hearing the statements they were asked to recall them. The actual
8writing of the speech was deferred for a week. Before the speech was 
written subjects were again asked to recall the: statements they had 
heard. Their results showed no differences at first recall attributable 
to either audience or direction of arguments. At the second recall, 
however, subjects in the congruent condition (when the speech being 
given fit with the audience, i.e., talking about raising teachers' 
salaries to the National Council of Teachers) retained more information 
than subjects in the incongruent condition. This result shows that the 
perceived attitudinal characteristics of an audience may affect the 
kind of information one will retain when it is known the material must: 
be communicated to that audience.
More recent studies, however, have failed to find support for the 
selective retention hypothesis. Fitzgerald and Ausubel (1963) failed 
to find that a positive attitudinal bias facilitated and a negative 
attitudinal bias inhibited the learning of controversial material re­
lated to the North's and the South's views on the Civil War. They 
tested this effect with high school students in social studies classes. 
Waly and Cook (1966) replicated Jones and Kohler's (1958) study but 
did not find any differences relating attitude to memory. Waly and 
Cook (1966) state in this regard:
The hypothesis that strong social attitudes differentially 
facilitate learning and retention is consistent with other 
dynamic theories of unconscious mental activity. For this 
reason it has seemed quite reasonable to accept the hypoth­
esis on the basis of a relatively small amount of available 
evidence. The studies reported here imply that the hypoth­
esis is limited by conditions as yet unspecified" (p. 288).
Difficulty replicating Levine and Murphy's (1943) results has
been reported by other researchers as well. Greenwald and Sakumura
(1967) argued that the earlier experiments which obtained corroborating
yevidence for the selective retention hypothesis failed to control an 
important variable, namely, prior familiarity with the material to be 
learned. They state:
It is well known that, in natural settings, individuals 
receive more exposure to information that supports their 
attitudes than to nonsupportive information. This dif­
ference in prior exposure might produce selective learn­
ing findings in the absence of any genuine underlying 
phenomenon (p. 388).
They ran a series of three experiments to determine if selective 
learning was attributable to attitude or to prior familiarity with 
acceptable and unacceptable material. The material they used consisted 
of statements for and against United States involvement in Vietnam. 
Subjects were university students who listened to the tape recorded 
statements. After each statement they rated the degree of their famil­
iarity with its content. They heard the statements again and this time 
rated their degree of agreement with it. The statements had been pre­
sented by category, i.e., treaty obligations to South Vietnam, effects 
of bombing, etc. Recall was tested by reading the category title for 
each statement and asking to reproduce as accurately as possible the 
statement that was associated with each title. The results indicated 
a reliable relationship between familiarity and acceptability for in­
formation pertinent to the Vietnam issue. However, there was no evi­
dence of a relationship between familiarity and recall or acceptability 
and recall.
They replicated the experiment without using statement titles as 
recall cues and obtained the same results as before. They replicated 
again after carefully reviewing the methodology of previous studies 
on the assumption that the earlier researchers had not controlled for 
subjects "reading" the purpose of the experiment. When they controlled
10
for this factor by intentionally making subjects aware that _E was 
interested in the relationship between pre-existing attitudes and 
learning of attitude-relevant information, they found this made no 
difference either. The authors state: "It is difficult to identify 
any potentially significant aspect of the procedure of previous 
studies demonstrating selective learning" (p. 365). When the valence 
of the statement was considered, i.e., pro-or-anti-United States in­
volvement in Vietnam, it was shown that the anti-statements were 
significantly easier to learn than the pro-statements even though 
they were judged less familiar and less easy to remember. The authors 
explain this result in terms of the novelty of these statements and 
suggest this as a point of departure for further research.
Intuitively the relationship between learning and memory described 
by Levine and Murphy (1943) seemed so strong that researchers continued 
investigating the relationship. In an attempt to replicate the Levine 
and Murphy study while incorporating the plausibility dimension intro­
duced by Jones and Kohler (1958), Brigham and Cook (1969) used pro- 
and anti-segregation statements which were plausible or implausible. 
Subjects read a transcript containing these statements and were then 
asked to write down all they could remember using words as close to 
the original as possible. They were tested during 5 sessions with 
recall being tested after the first 3 trials. During the last two 
trials j3 was not given the opportunity to read the transcript before 
recall. In addition, they were given a recognition test which con­
sisted of identifying twenty statements which had been in the tran­
script which were mixed with twenty which had not appeared in the 
transcript. Neither the Levine and Murphy (1943) results (that sub­
11
jects remember best information which favors their attitudes) nor the
Jones and Kohler (1958) results (that subjects remember plausible
statements favoring their position better than implausible ones, but
learn better implausible statements about the opposing position) were
obtained. The authors conclude:
Perusal of past research in this area fails to unearth 
any clear-cut methodological differences which might 
account for the conflicting results of this and earlier 
studies. Alternative explanations in terms of differential 
prior familiarity with stimulus materials and differential 
novelty of stimulus materials do not appear adequate to 
account for the varying research outcomes. It appears that 
we now must accept the conclusion that the attitude-memory 
relationship, if it exists at all, applies only under cer­
tain conditions. It is evident that the specific nature 
of these conditions is not as yet understood (p. 243).
In a further attempt to replicate the Levine and Murphy finding, 
Smith and Jamieson (1972) manipulated an attitudinal related variable, 
ego-involvement, suggesting that attitude intensity and ego-involve­
ment were distinct constructs even though they may be correlated.
They hypothesized that high ego-involved subjects would learn more 
statements than low ego-involved subjects and that subjects would 
retain more information from statements that support their attitudes 
than from statements that conflict with these attitudes. The con­
troversial material they used were 3 pro- and 3 anti-statements re­
garding the belief in God. Subjects, on the basis of their responses 
to several questionnaires, were classified as to pro-, anti-, or 
neutral attitudes toward the existence of God at high and low levels 
>f ego-involvement. Their results offered no support for attitudinal 
selective learning or retention. In fact, it was the neutral subjects 
who showed the larger pro- and anti-statement differences, tending to
recall more anti-statements. Why this difference occurred the authors
could not explain. Their results did show that high ego- involved sub­
jects learned more than low ego-involved subjects and suggest that ego- 
involvement may offer some explanation to account for varying results 
among previous studies to the extent that subjects in different groups 
may have varied on this variable.
The negative findings reported above cast further suspicion on 
the generality of the selective retention hypothesis. However, some 
researchers continue to find support for selective retention with 
varied methodological procedures and independent variables. Miller 
and Bacon (1971) were able to demonstrate that close-minded subjects 
took longer to recognize humorous elements of a stimulus when the 
humor stemmed from the introduction of information that conflicted 
with existing beliefs. They used a humorous sexual stimulus from 
the Harvard Lampoon and hypothesized that
. . . certain characteristics of closed belief systems 
suggest that close-minded individuals should have more 
rigid beliefs about sex. If this is the case, close- 
minded persons should, at the least, be more reluctant 
to report high humor ratings for sexually-oriented 
material, and at the most, should actually judge such 
material as less humorous than their open-minded 
counterparts (p. 151).
This study suggests that subject personality characteristics like 
close-mindedness may be Important determiners of selective retention.
Greaves (1972) manipulated a similar cognitive variable referred 
to in his study as "level of conceptual system functioning." The 
schema for conceptual system functioning identified what he called 
system 1 and system 3 subjects. System 1 subjects were piototypic 
of the authoritarian personality (similar to the close-minded subjects 
in Miller and Bacon's study). System 3 subjects were prototypic of 
peer-group dependent persons. Subjects were presented with slides
12
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depicting a wide variety of scenes and statistical information about 
the United States and Sweden by a high status., high expertise source. 
(The authors state that the subject matter was chosen since the 
"American way of life" has proven to be a highly ego-involving sub­
ject.) For some of the subjects the narrator was biased in favor 
of the United States against Sweden and for other subjects he was 
biased in favor of Sweden. The results showed that system 1 subjects 
recalled information concerning the country in whose favor the source 
was biased (be it Sweden or the United States) but did not recall in­
formation for the other country. System 3 subjects recalled pro- 
United States information best regardless of the source's bias. The 
author states, in regard to these results, that
The system 1 subjects apparently may be induce! to mis- 
perceive and distort input, as well as ignore their 
normal reference-group values, simply on the basis of 
authority bias or directive. . . . Since authoritarian 
persons are presumably ingratiating to high status per­
sons, the behavior of these subjects is consistent with 
. . . findings that subject's awareness of source bias 
may increase attitude change by showing them ;he way to 
ingratiate the source (p. 331).
In regard to system 3 subjects the author states:
System 3 persons obviously represent a different breed 
. . . and one wonders if conformity to peer-group or 
reference-group norms is not so great as to preclude 
their willingness (or ability) to attend to discrepant 
input, regardless of source status (p. 331).
Wicky (1970), in studying the effects of attitudes upon the
immediate and delayed recall of controversial material, hypothesized
a differential effect as a function of whether or not J3 was given an
introduction to the messages (the introduction consisted of telling
the subjects the nature of the viewpoints). His reasoning was that
if Sj> were not given an introduction they would have to organize the
14
message as they learned it and, as a result, would fail to recall 
material opposing their viewpoints. The results confirmed the 
hypothesis under the immediate recall condition. The author states, 
"Belief systems involve cognitive structures which help the learner 
differentiate the stimulus elements of the learning task when it is 
unclear or complex" (p. 2271).
The studies incorporating cognitive variables like open-and- 
closed-mindedness or level of conceptual system functioning appear 
to have identified an important factor operating in situations where 
attitudes have been shown to affect learning and retention. It ap­
pears, too, that these cognitive factors may be experimentally in­
duced as Wicky (1970) has shown or they may be operating as consis­
tent patterns in subjects as both Greaves (1972) and Miller and Bacon 
(1971) have shown.
Kanungo and Dutta (1966) and Dutta and Kanungo (1967) have identi­
fied still another variable which seems to be a determiner of selective 
retention. This variable is the perceived intensity of the affect of 
the stimulus. They have been able to demonstrate that the intensity 
of an affective experience as perceived by an individual or a group 
determines its retention.
. . . any variable that can influence or bring about 
changes in the perceived intensity of affect of the 
individual's experiences is also the variable that 
indirectly affects their selective retention. It is, 
therefore, important that research directed toward 
studying the nature of selective retention of affec­
tive experience pay more attention to conditions af­
fecting intensities of nerceived affect than to con­
ditions affecting individual's attitudes, values, or 
motivational systems (Dutta and Kanungo, 1967, p. 481).
One final study which is unique in its design as far as the tradi­
tion of studies in selective retention is concerned is that by Feather
15
(1969). Whereas most researchers in their attempts to verify the 
selective retention hypothesis have provided subjects with materials 
regarding some controversial issue to be learned during the experi­
mental session, Feather (1969) provided no such stimulus material.
Rather, subjects were provided with sentence leads to elicit argu­
ments in favor of or against United States involvement in Vietnam.
For example, to elicit arguments in favor of United States involve­
ment in Vietnam subjects were given the lead: "Continued American 
intervention in South Vietnam is justified because . . . and JS was 
to complete it and state whether he agreed or disagreed with it.
This was likewise done for pro-disagree, con-agree, and con-disagree 
arguments. Subject's attitude concerning United States involvement 
in Vietnam was measured by semantic differential ratings of state­
ments about United States involvement. The results showed that under 
the conditions of free recall, subjects reported more arguments that 
were consistent with their attitudes than arguments that were incon­
sistent with their attitudes. The results also showed that the in­
tensity of the attitude affected selective recall, i.e., as support 
for American involvement became stronger more pro-agree and con- 
disagree arguments were reported.
The research on selective retention may be summarized in the 
following manner: attitude does affect what is learned and remembered 
but a number of factors are important in determining which attitudinally 
relevant or irrelevant information will be remembered. It cannot be 
stated unequivocally that one will remember only material which is 
congruent with his attitudes. Ego involvement, the function that the 
material will serve for subjects (i.e., having to defend his position
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in an argument), the nature of the audience to whom one must communi­
cate, the affective nature of the material, the cognitive structure 
of the subject, and prior familiarity with the material, all make a 
difference in determining what information will be selected by S_ to 
be learned and retained.
In addition to subject factors and the type of stimulus material 
used, methodological differences (e.g., Feather, 1969) may affect the 
direction of the results. One important such difference is the choice 
of recall as opposed to recognition measures of memory. Most studies 
have used free recall as the dependent variable, though Brigham and 
Cook (1969), Edwards (1941), and Fitzgerald and Ausubel (1963) used 
recognition memory to measure retention.
The present study, in attempting to utilize the findings of 
previous studies on selective retention, used affective materials 
(favorable, neutral, or unfavorable statements about men and women) 
and cognitive orientation to the material (liberal or conservative) 
to assess the effect of attitude towards women upon remembering 
favorable, neutral, or unfavorable statements about men and women.
In addition, a methodological charge which provides a more sensitive 
measure of memory (based on signal detection theory) was used. The 
advantage of this approach over traditional methods is discussed 
under the section "Theory of Signal Detection (TSD)."
Literature on Sex Differences
As the Feminist movement gained momentum and popularity towards 
the end of the 60s, the popular literature about men and women in­
creased many-fold. The scientific literature also showed evidence 
of this burgeoning with many more studies appearing in the journals
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where sex was Included as an interest variable.
The nature of sex differences in behavior and attitude are cur­
rently of much interest and much emotion has been created around the 
topic. The tenor of feeling can be detected in the following passage 
by Janeway (1971):
The division of the world by sexes, challenged a century 
and more ago by the militants of the first wave of Feminism, 
still endures and, what’s more, still prevails, in spite of 
new attacks upon it. 'Man's world' and 'women's place' 
have confronted each other since Scylla first faced Charybdis.
If the passage between is stormier today than it has ever 
been, the two old saws still rear above the flood, leaning 
together in logical intimacy, dividing the world in order 
to encompass it. For if women have only a place, clearly 
the rest of the world must belong to someone else and, 
therefore, in default of God, to men (p. 7).
In this emotional climate it seemed appropriate to return to that
"phenomenon of yesteryear" namely, selective retention, and assess the
effect of attitude toward women on memory for statements about men and
women. However, one must find out which sex differences in memory are
pertinent to a study of the effect of attitude on retention. As
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) wrote:
We do not regard memory as a 'capacity* but as a set of 
processes. Individuals (and groups) differ in their skill 
in using these processes. Furthermore, there can be dif­
ferences among individuals or groups in what is remembered.
That is, in a subject matter area where an individual al­
ready has a good deal of Information and where his interest 
is high, he has a substantial body of related material with 
which to associate new, incoming information; furthermore, 
he is motivated to employ whatever strategies he knows how 
to use, such as active rehearsal of the new material, in 
order to ensure that it will be available for later re­
trieval. If there are sex differences in interests, areas 
of knowledge, and abilities, then, we would expect these 
to be reflected in memory (p. 56-59).
In their review of the literature on sex differences in memory, 
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) described the distinction between learning 
and memory as an arbitrary one and chose to include under memory
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those studies which the authors of the articles referred to as memory 
studies. They classified their studies in terms of verbal memory, 
object memory, and memory for digits. Verbal memory studies included 
studies where word lists, sentences, word strings, names of objects, 
and answering questions about stories were the tasks. Studies of 
object memory included studies where the task was to recall real ob­
jects seen, pictures of objects (animals, household objects, etc.), 
alphabet letters, and line drawings. Studies using digits utilized 
grouped and ungrouped digits. Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) also in­
cluded studies using tasks which were combinations of verbal and non­
verbal materials in a paired associates presentation. Their general 
conclusions were that females showed somewhat better memory for verbal 
content. They stated:
More than half the studies have found no sex differences, 
but when differences are found, girls have higher scores 
in every case. The superiority of girls in verbal memory 
is especially clear after about the age of 7 (p. 59).
They indicate that for objects and digits sex differences are seldom 
found and that combinations of verbal and non-verbal material present 
a mixed picture— some studies favor females and some favor males.
Although Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) present a comprehensive re­
view up to 1973, they failed to include several significant studies. 
There has also been some important research reported in the journals 
since 1973. The results of these additional studies will be consid­
ered and Maccoby and Jacklin*s (1974) conclusions will be reevaluated 
in light of this additional information.
Seven of the studies where word lists comprised the memory task 
have found females to be superior to males: May and Hutt (1974) using 
a list of nouns presented visually and auditorily to a group of 9 year
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olds; Kroes and Libby (1973) using words presented orally to fourth, 
sixth and eighth graders; Lester and Miller (1974) with a series of 
8 nine-word lists with college students; Hallahan et al. (1974) with 
second, fourth, sixth, and eighth graders learning animal and food 
related words; Kroes and Libby (1971) with college students using 
words from different categories; Ernest and Faivio (1971) using a 
list of nouns with college students; and Cuvo and Witryal (1971) 
with fourth and fifth graders remembering a list of words. Only 
Epstein (1974) showed males superior to females when word lists were 
used and this difference occurred only with the high school sample, 
not the college sample. Epstein (1974) was of the opinion that at 
the high school level more boys than girls had dropped out so mostly 
the academic-minded boys participated in the experiment. One study, 
Goldberg et al. (1974), reported no sex differences.
Fisher and Harris (1973) and Todd and Kessler (1971) reported 
differences favoring females when story materials were used for the 
memory task. The task of the former consisted of a lecture on per­
sonality testing given to college students and the latter utilized 
a story entitled "War of the Ghosts," also with college students.
One study, Globig and Touhey (1971), found males superior to females. 
The story material they used consisted of a lecture dealing with the 
history of the country Zanzibar. These studies would tend to support 
Maccoby and Jacklin's conclusions concerning female superiority in 
remembering verbal content but also suggest that under certain condi­
tions and with certain materials males may perform better than females.
When geometric forms, faces, or pictures are used the results are 
more variable. Kaess and Witryal (1955) found females better at re-
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membering faces and Marks (1973) found females doing better when com­
plete scenes (e.g., Venice Canal) were used. When geometric forms 
constituted the memory task, Marx, Witter and Meuller (1972) found 
males superior to females in observing tilted line patterns. Imam 
(1973) found females superior when nonsense syllables were paired 
with geometric figures, and Aliotti (1974) found no difference with 
designs. With the inclusion of these additional studies Maccoby 
and Jacklin's (1974) conclusion still stands:
Verbal content in a memory task may give some advantage 
to girls, but it clearly cannot be said that either sex 
has a superior memory capacity, or a superior set of 
skills in the storage and retrieval of information, 
when a variety of content is considered. Nor does 
existing evidence point to a difference in choice of 
mnemonic strategies (p. 59).
A series of memory studies where the task consisted of remembering 
same sex and opposite sex items (male and female faces, sex-typed ob­
jects, etc.) are of direct relevance to the present study since dif­
ferential recall of male and female items constitute part of the pre­
sent task. These studies have tended to find that males remember male 
items better than female items and females remember female items better 
than male items.
In one of these studies, a study of social memory, Witryal and 
Kaess (1957) utilized three memory tests: the Memory for Names and 
Faces Subscale of the George Washington University Social Intelligence 
Test, where _S was asked to memorize the names under 12 photographs of 
men; a miniature social situation where E conducted a sidewalk inter­
view and later asked Ss to match the names with faces of people he had 
interviewed; and a test called the KW (for Kaess and Witryal) memory 
for names and faces. In this test ten male and ten female pocket size
photos were randomly arranged by sex and a name was printed under each 
photo. The subject was allowed to study the photos for five minutes 
and was then presented with thirty smaller photos, the originals plus 
ten others. Each subject was given five alternative names to choose 
from in matching the correct name and photo. Their results on all 
three memory tasks found women to be superior to men. They also 
found on the KW test that males remember males better than they remem­
ber females, and females remember females better than they remember 
males.
In a similar study McCall et al. (1974) gave the Memory for Names 
and Faces Subscale to one group of college students, the Xerox Corpora­
tion Effective Listening test to another, a modification of the Harris- 
Bruni test of accuracy of observing appearance and conversation to two 
other groups, and a 60 item test of accuracy of observing gestures 
from videotapes to a fifth group. Females were superior to males on 
tests where males and females were observed together but not on tests 
involving males only. In same sex recall, females scored higher in 
observing female stimuli than male stimuli, while males performed 
conversely.
Cross, Cross, and Daly (1971) found a differential sex difference 
for recognizing faces— women recognized other females more readily than 
they recognized males, while men recognized male and female faces with 
equal ease. They explained this result as a consequence of differen­
tial social experiences given by parents to their children. With fe­
male children parents tend to place greater emphasis and importance on 
physical attractiveness. Women, then, become more sensitive to physi­
cal differences in their own appearance and in the appearance of other
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females to a greater degree than they do the appearance of males.
Yarmey (1974) also utilized a memory for male and female faces 
task with college students. He was concerned with whether or not 
male and female faces would be encoded differently and tested whether 
a release from proactive interference occurs following a shift in 
learning male faces to learning females faces and vice versa. He 
switched the sex of the face at trial five. The results showed fe­
male faces were more difficult to recognize than males faces after 
a build-up of proactive interference suggesting that differential 
interference for sex attributes had occurred. There were no differences 
in release effect for male and female subjects but females were superior 
to males in retention on trials 1-4.
Switching from faces to sex-typed words one finds the same differ­
ential pattern of remembering occurring. Bousfield and Cohen (1956) 
utilized twenty male interest words and twenty female interest words 
in a memory task with college students. The students, after having 
seen the items, were asked to recall as many of the words as possible. 
They found an overall difference in favor of females recalling and 
clustering more words than males. More female words were recalled 
and clustered than were male words. Also, subjects tended to recall 
and cluster more words in their own interest categories than in the 
interest categories of the opposite sex. The authors state,
. . .  if sex differences in verbal associative processes 
are as marked as they seem to us to be, this factor merits 
consideration in various types of research in verbal be­
havior. . . . likewise, it seems important to indicate 
that differences of the type here demonstrated between 
males and females are likely to occur in any experimental 
situation utilizing verbal material on mixed groups (p.
164).
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In two studies, one with a London sample and one with an American 
sample, Nadelman (1970, 1974) tested recall, recognition, knowledge, 
and preference for masculine and feminine items in London and American 
5 year olds and in American 8 year olds. An example of a masculine 
item was "working a crane" and a feminine item was "bathing a baby."
The recall task consisted of ten masculine and ten feminine items pre­
sented singly on a table in front of the child and read aloud by JE.
Ss were asked to tell _E what they had just seen. In the recognition 
task the 20 old cards were mixed with 20 new cards and Ssj were asked 
to give to E the ones they had seen before. The results for recall 
in both studies showed that boys recalled more masculine than feminine 
items; girls recalled more feminine than masculine items. Nadelman 
(1970) states that
If one counts the frequency of children who recalled 
more masculine than feminine items, or an equal number 
of masculine and feminine items, or more feminine than 
masculine items, girls showed a little more sex-typing 
than boys (p. 33).
The recognition task showed no significant differences. They felt that 
the failure to obtain differences with the recognition data may have 
been due to the fact that the scores were high for all groups and this 
possible ceiling effect may have hidden existing differences.
The foregoing evidence indicates that differential retention of 
same or opposite sex stimuli occurs. Most often the results are in 
the direction of remembering material consistent with one’s sex or 
sex role. It may not be fair to say that these results are due to 
differences in attitude towards the same or opposite sex since these 
studies did not manipulate any attitudinal dimensions. It is weak 
evidence, though, that attitudes toward the same or opposite sex may
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be operating. In order to systematically investigate the effect of 
attitude on differential recognition of male and female items it 
would be necessary to categorize subjects along an attitude dimension. 
The present study, to do this, has utilized the Attitude Towards Women 
Scale (AWS).
Attitude Toward Women Scale (AWS)
The Attitude Toward Women Scale (AWS) is a 55-item questionnaire 
designed by Spence anu Helmreich (1972a) to assess attitudes people 
have toward the role of women in society (see Appendix A). [Spence, 
Helmreich and Stapp (1973) have since constructed a shorter, 25-item, 
version of the AWS. Correlations between the short and long versions 
were .95 or above and the factor structure of both versions were 
similar.] The authors wanted a psychometrically sound, up-to-date 
instrument for surveying attitudes towards women. The only other 
similar scale which existed was the Kirkpatrick Belief-Pattern Scale 
for Measuring Attitudes Toward Feminism, which was three decades old 
(Kirkpatrick, 1936).
Each item on the AWS consisted of a declarative statement for 
which there were four response alternatives: Agree Strongly, Agree 
Mildly, Disagree Mildly, and Disagree Strongly. An item on the scale 
was scored from 1 to 4. A 1 response represented a traditional, con­
servative attitude and a 4 response represented a liberal, profeminist 
attitude. These response values were totalled to obtain a subject's 
score, the range being from 55 to 220. The scale was set up to be 
machine scorable.
When Spence and Helmreich (1972a) constructed the scale the items 
were categorized by content into six more or less independent groups.
These categories were: marital relationships and obligations; sexual 
behavior; drinking, swearing, and dirty jokes; dating, courtship, and 
etiquette; freedom and independence; vocational, educational, and in­
tellectual roles.
The scale was standardized on introductory psychology students 
at the University of Texas at Austin during the fall and spring of the 
1971-72 academic year. The authors state, "Inspection of these data 
indicates that the distribution for the two semesters are similar, 
particularly for the women. The stability of the distributions thus 
suggests, indirectly, that a reliable phenomenon is being tapped"
(p. 6). The distribution of scores showed a slight positive skew 
towards the liberal end of the scale. Men tended to be more con­
servative than women.
The AWS was also given to parents of the spring student sample 
in an attempt to assess a general societal shift in attitudes toward 
women's roles. It was expected that the students would depart more 
from traditional beliefs than their parents. As in the student sample 
the mean score for mothers was higher than the mean score for fathers. 
When compared with their offspring, parent scores were lower. Daugh­
ters tended to be more liberal in comparison to their mothers than 
were sons in comparison to their fathers.
Regarding the reliability of the AWS, Spence (personal communica­
tion, 1975) stated:
Because of the stability of the factor structure and the 
nature of the development of the AWS, we did not include 
reliability figures in the JSAS article. We do have 
Cronbach alphas for the initial sample of students, how­




The only kind of evidence on validity is of the construct 
type which may be found by examining the literature re­
lating AWS scores to other factors. In our own work, 
for example, I refer you to male-female and parent-child 
differences which are in the direction they 'ought* to be. 
Similarily, our interpersonal attraction work in which the 
AWS was used provides further construct validation.
Several studies which have used the AWS have appeared in the lit­
erature. Lunneborg (1974) found essentially the same results reported 
by Spence and Helmreich (1972a) (that males were more conservative than 
females and older subjects more conservative than younger subjects) on 
a northern population (University of Washington). She used the scale 
as a 'before' and 'after' measure to assess the change brought about 
by a course in women studies. She found the pre-test difference which 
showed males less liberal disappeared upon post-testing after the 
course. She concludes: "This scale has demonstrated its utility as 
an assessment device for courses in women studies programs . . . the 
scale is sensitive to changes in attitude" (p. 1282).
Spence and Helmreich (1972b) utilized the AWS in a study of inter­
personal attraction where a female stimulus person (SP) portrayed, in 
a videotaped interview, a competent or incompetent individual who was 
feminine or masculine in her interests. The CPI femininity scale was 
used to assess masculine or feminine interests and the AWS was used to 
assess attitude. The scores on the AWS were pooled and divided into 
upper, middle, and lower thirds representing liberal, moderate and 
traditional attitudes. The evaluation questionnaire items used in 
evaluating the SPs contained social likability and work likability 
items.
Their results showed that female SPs who were masculine in their
interest patterns were more likable than their feminine counterparts,
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the competent masculine jjP being liked most of all. "This bias was 
evidenced not merely in likability, but in ratings of other desirable 
characteristics, the masculine SPs being judged to be better adjusted, 
more intelligent, and more sincere" (Spence & Helmreich, 1972b) (p. 
210-211). Also, all groups preferred the competent SP to the incompe­
tent one except the traditional males in their responses to the femi­
nine figures— they preferred the incompetent feminine SF over the 
competent one.
The preference for masculine SPs was particularly evident in
liberal women. Spence and Helmreich (1972b) state,
This subgroup of women not only reacted favorably to the 
competent masculine SP, but, unlike their less liberated 
sisters, were almost as positive in their reactions to 
the masculine SI? who was incompetent. To these women, 
competency in masculine activities was apparently not 
the element of critical importance; it was the attempt 
that counted. . . . One possibility that suggests it­
self is that even "liberated" women may often have ac­
cepted at face value stereotypic notions about the supe­
riority of men and the traits that make them so. Thus, 
rather than proclaiming that "Female is fantastic" or 
attempting to develop new, genderless standards of be­
havior, they may try, perhaps without awareness, to gain 
a superior status by assimilating masculine characteris­
tics and values. To a certain extent even young women 
with more traditional values may partially share these 
views. They may not care to emulate masculine behaviors 
personally, but the present results suggest that they do 
not necessarily react unfavorably to other women who do 
(p. 211).
Liberal males also tended to show the same kind of tolerance of 
the incompetent masculine SP, much preferring her to the feminine in­
competent. However, their masculine bias was not as strong as the 
women's in the case of the competent SP. The liberal ana moderate 
males rated the competent feminine jH? as favorably as they did the 
competent masculine one, something the women did not do.
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The traditional males also liked the competent masculine SP 
over the others. They liked least the masculine incompetent SP.
As far as traditional men are concerned, Spence and Helmreich (1972b) 
state, "If women try to do 'masculine things,' then they should be 
sufficiently, 'manly' to do them well."
These studies show that the AWS is a valid research instrument 
and that it can be a useful tool in studies of sex differences. It 
was used in the present study to identify men and women with liberal, 
moderate and conservative attitudes towards women's roles in society 
in an attempt to find evidence for selective retention by men and 
women with different attitudes towards women for affective statements 
about men and women. The following hypotheses were formulated:
1. That women would remember more statements than men.
2. That men and women would differentially remember statements 
about men and women.
3. That attitude toward women (liberal or conservative) would 
differentially affect memory for favorable, neutral or unfavorable 
statements about men and women (the selective retention hypotheses).
To test these hypotheses the theory of signal detection was 
applied. Before describing the experimental procedure used it would 
be advantageous to the reader to introduce signal detection theory 
and its application to memory studies.
Theory of Signal Detection (TSD)
In order to understand the uniqueness of TSD, it may be helpful 
to set it in the context of classical psychophysics. In this way it 
may be easier to see the nature of the problems TSD helped resolve 
and identify the changes in conceptualizing human processes it helped
bring about. For a more detailed description see Green and Swets 
(1966).
Psychophysics began with Fechner's discovery of methods for 
measuring thresholds for different sense modalities. Basically, 
the threshold was measured by determining the intensity required 
for a signal to be just detectable. Signals that did not reach 
the threshold were assumed to have no effect on the organism.
Fechner's first experiments, however, showed that there was no con­
sistent detection of a signal of given intensity, suggesting the 
threshold changed over time.
Accompanying this problem of physiological variability was the 
problem of psychological variability. Psychological variability re­
fers to factors that affect the subject's set, attitude or motivation 
which must be controlled wherever possible. In classical psychophysics 
the subject's physiological reactivity or sensitivity to a given 
stimulus, e.g., his ability to detect a pure tone of a given intensity 
embedded in noise, was confounded with his willingness to report that 
a tone had been presented. As Banks (1970) has stated:
In detection of a weak signal an observer might be 
insensitive because of a limitation in the sensory 
organ in question; on the other hand, he might ap­
pear insensitive because he is overcautious and re­
ports only signals that he is sure were presented.
Either factor could serve equally well to raise an 
observer's measured sensory threshold. There are, 
of course, many other ways an observer's response 
biases can be superimposed over his basic sensory 
processes, and TSD was evolved in an effort to 
separate the truly sensory aspects of detection from 
the decision aspects (p. 82).
Commenting on TSD's efficacy in resolving the confounding of 
sensory acuteness with response bias Green and Swets (1966) state:
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. . .  a principal advantage of modern detection theory is 
that it shows how to compress a host or factors which 
affect the observer's attitude into a single variable, 
called the decision or response criterion, and how to 
use false-alarm responses to estimate the level of the 
criterion. By extracting two parameters from the data—  
one related to attitude and one to sensitivity— instead 
of just a single sensitivity (threshold) parameter, the 
procedures of detection theory isolate nonsensory factors, 
so that a relatively pure measure of sensitivity remains.
These procedures, in other words, provide an analytical 
technique for separating two distinct processes, and thus 
allow us to measure each process independently of the 
other. Although not a logical necessity, in defining a 
response criterion, or "response threshold," detection 
theory gives up the concept of a sensory threshold— sub­
stituting for it the concept of continuously variable, 
nondichotomized sensitivity (p. 118-119).
In TSD the measure of a subject's sensory acuteness is referred to as 
d' (d prime) and the measure of his willingness to report that a cer­
tain event has occurred, response bias, is ^ (beta).
The fundamental task in signal detection is to determine, in a 
given observation, if a signal was presented (Swets, Tanner, Birdsall, 
in Swets, 1964). Inherent in this task is "noise" which is always 
present to some degree in the nervous system. Broadbent (1971) stated 
that:
. . .  it is obvious that all human performance contains 
an occasional element of error, and that perfect trans­
mission of information through the nervous system is not 
attained. Any consideration of the working of the ner­
vous system makes it clear that there are myriad possible 
causes of unreliability and failure at every stage; cells 
may die or be refractory, facilitatory stimulation may be 
present or absent, and all processes such as conduction 
or transmission across synapses may vary in speed (p. 12).
A signal of some intensity added to the noise composes the detection
task. The observer says either "yes" the signal was present or "no"
it was not.
One of the major assumptions of signal detection theory is that
any observation varies from presentation to presentation in a way
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which can be adequately described by the normal curve. This assumption 
is equivalent to Thurstone's concept of discriminal dispersion in his 
method of categorical judgment (Green & Swets, 1966). A particular 
observation may be of signal plus noise (SN) or of noise alone (N), 
but in either condition the distributions arising are assumed to be 
normal. The addition of a signal simply displaces the SN distribution 
further away from the N distribution (see Figure 1).
Figure 1, Likelihood axis.
The decision problem posed the obsex*ver is one of selecting alter­
native hypotheses (Licklider, in Swets, 1964). The observer must decide 
if a particular observation is coming from the noise distribution 
(hypothesis one) or from the signal plus noise distribution (hypothesis 
two). He establishes a criterion along the continuum of observations 
which he uses in giving his decision. This continuum is known as the 
likelihood axis.
In any decision there are only four possible outcomes: the obser­
ver may say "yes, it is a signal" or "no, it is not" and he may be 
either correct or incorrect. Let us assume has established point 
C in Figure 1 as his criterion. If a presented signal has a neural 
effect greater than criterion C, and j3 reports "signal," he will be 
correct (hit). This outcome is represented as occurring in probability
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density area one. If a signal is presented but the neural effect is 
less than C, says "no signal." The outcome will be in probability 
density area four, and will be incorrect (miss). If no signal is 
presented but the neural effect is greater than C, reports "signal" 
and will be incorrect again (false alarm). This outcome is shown by 
probability density area three. If he reports "no signal" he will 
be correct (correct rejection) with the outcome being in probability 
density area two.
A series of trials in a detection experiment will produce fre­
quencies for each of these four kinds of outcomes. When divided by 
the number of signal-plus-noise or noise trials, whichever is appro­
priate, these frequencies can be expressed as proportions of those 
trials in which the signal occurred or did not occur (see Figure 2).
(Hit) (Miss)
P(s/SN) P(n/SN)





P(s/:N) = the probability of responding "signal" given the signal 
did occur.
P(n/SN) = the probability of responding "no signal" given that 
the signal did occur.
P(s/N) = the probability of responding "signal" given no signal 
occurred.
P(n/N) = the probability of responding "no signal" given no 
signal occurred.
Figure 2. Decision outcomes in signal detection analysis.
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d' is calculated by converting the obtained proportions for hits and 
false alarms to Z scores. d' is equivalent to the distance, in Z 
score units, between means of the SN and N distribution; the differ­
ence between these Z scores equals d*. Corresponding to each Z is 
an ordinate of the normal curve from which $ is calculated. "The 
corresponding ordinate of the distribution is the probability that 
the quantity will reach exactly the Z score rather than exceeding it" 
(Broadbent, 1971, p. 74). The ratio of the ordinates of the hit rate 
and false alarm rate indicate where S's performance ) is along the 
likelihood axis.
By manipulating the payoff structure S1s criterion can be changed. 
The information input remains the same, i.e., the signal intensity re­
mains the same, but by changing the payoff, and hence, S's criterion,' —
the proportions of each possible outcome are changed. This will pro- 
duce another measure of hits and false alarms. Several other measures 
can be obtained in this manner. This manipulation of payoff structure 
produces what is called a Type I analysis (Banks, 1970). This proce­
dure is commonly called the yes-no procedure.
An alternative procedure called the rating method can also be 
used. With the rating method jS must not only indicate the presence 
or absence of a signal but also indicate his confidence along some 
scale that the signal was in fact, presented. This means that rather 
than manipulating S * s criterion by changing the payoff, S> is holding 
multiple criteria simultaneously. This produces an obvious saving in 
time and requires only one experimental operation to gather all the 
necessary data. It also allows J3 to make finer discriminations
(Pollack & Decker, in Swets, 1964). This procedure allows for N-l
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measures of d' and p where N is the number of confidence categories.
A value of d' and its corresponding f} can then be used in the analysis 
of variance to test for differences among groups or conditions of an 
experiment.
A recognition memory experiment is very similar to the psycho­
physical detection experimeu . here TSD found its early applications. 
In memory studies TSD . eives of a memory trace as a signal
that a person must detect in order to perform in a retention task" 
(Banks, 1970). The old list is considered to be the same as SN; the 
new list is the same as N (D'Amato, 1970). The detection of the 
signal depends upon the input of stimulus information, i.e., meaning- 
fulness, list length, and other variables affecting the storage of 
material in memory (d'), as well as upon the person's willingness to 
make a decision that a sensory process is the signal, or in other 
words, his judgmental criterion (/? ).
Bernbach (1967) relates the problem of separating subject's sensi­
tivity from his response bias to memory experiments:
The subject in a recognition memory experiment is faced 
with a decision problem very similar to that facing the 
J3 performing a psychophysical detection task. For example, 
in an experiment in which must identify each of a series 
of stimuli as old or new . . .  he can vary his proportion 
of correct identifications of old items by a criterion 
shift. That is, he can permit his proportion of false 
alarms (calling new stimuli old) to change in accordance 
with his perception of the relative cost of the two types 
of errors, false alarms and missed recognitions (p. 462).
Bernbach (1967) states further: "The criterion is reflected in the
false alarm rate, and correcting for false alarms by the use of the d'
measure has become quite common in the study of recognition memory"
(p. 479).
35
Green and Swets (1966), and Bernbach (1967) have both suggested 
that the effects of response bias appear in the false alarm rate and 
that it is the consideration of false alarms that gives TSD its ad­
vantage over other measures. The neglect by researchers to adeq .ately 
consider false alarms in memory experiments was clearly stated by 
Broadbent (1971):
When we turn to the field of memory, we find once again 
that classical experiments have paid relatively little 
attention to the problem of false alarms. In the case 
of memory, these false alarms take the form of items re­
called despite the fact that they were never presented.
In the laboratory, false alarms have however rarely been 
considered, save in the particular case of intrusion 
errors from other interfering learning (p, 387).
The essential difference between conventional memory experiments 
and memory experiments based on decision theory is the rating task, 
whereby indicates his degree of confidence In his judgment of a 
particular stimulus item. From these ratings the hit and false alarm 
rates are determined and then, d' and f l . Under the conventional 
(threshold) model of memory the number of correct responses was the 
measure used. If false alarms were considered at all they were con­
sidered to be guesses and were subtracted from the number of correct 
responses using a formula, such as: true score = (percent of old 
stimuli recognized) - (percent of new stimuli falsely recognized) 
(Green & Swets, 1966). In the traditional threshold model hit and 
false alarm rate varied in a linear fashion. TSD, however, shows 
that hits and false alarms do not change at the same rate. More 
precisely, small changes in the false alarm rate are accompanied by 
much larger changes in hit rate, larger, even than one would expect 
on the basis of chance (Broadbent, 1971). If empirical evidence sup­
ports this differential change in hit and false alarm rates, then,
clearly, the classical threshold theory is not suitable. Rather, a 
model which conceives of memory strength being continuously variable 
would be more fitting, as TSD does.
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Egan (cited in Green & Swets, 1966) was the first to apply the 
TSD analysis in a rating experiment. He used monosyllabic words pre­
sented visually with 100 words in the old set and 100 in the new set. 
One group of subjects was given one presentation of the old list and 
another group of subjects was given two presentations of the old list. 
Subjects gave their responses a confidence rating on a 7-point scale. 
His analysis showed that hit and false alarms did not change at the 
same rate. Also, he found, as expected, that two presentations of 
the li3ts produced larger d's than a single presentation did. This
result attests to the validity of using d' as a measure cf retention.
5" ‘ 'v ’
Numerous other researchers have utilized TSD in memory studies. 
However, it is not the purpose of this paper to present a review of 
rating experiments or of the theoretical issues related to TSD and 
memory. The interested reader is referred to Banks (1970), Bernbach 
(L967) and Parks (1966). Rather, the purpose has been to familiarize 




Overview of the Procedure
The methodology may be divided into two parts, that applying to 
adjective scaling and selection, and that applying to the memory task.
In the scaling task college students were asked to rate adjectives as 
they applied to men and women in a favorable or unfavorable way.
Ratings were statistically analyzed to eliminate adjectives which 
showed any sex biases. In the memory task the adjectives were formed 
into statements about men and women which were then used in constructing 
memory lists. Subjects viewed half the statements on a projection 
screen. Later they were given a combined list of old and new items 
and asked to identify, using confidence ratings, the old and new items. 
The dependent variables (d1, beta, and percent correct) were analyzed 
as a function of sex of subject, Attitude Toward Women Scale (AWS) 
category, sex of statement, and favorability of statement.
Adjective Scaling and Selection
Subjects
The raters performing the scaling task were college students en­
rolled in introductory and educational psychology at the University of 
North Dakota during the spring semester of 1974. They were given the 
task during the regular lecture period and did not receive any course 
credit. Two different groups, each composed of eighteen men and
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eighteen women completed the scaling task (total N = 72).
Procedure
From the index of Roget's Pocket Thesaurus (1963), 481 adjectives 
describing people were selected. These adjectives were typed alpha­
betically (except for the reliability items) and presented in booklet 
form to the raters (see Appendix B). Because of the large number of 
adjectives to be scaled they were divided into two lists, each of 
which was administered to a separate group of raters. Forty-nine 
adjectives were repeated within the two lists to allow reliability 
computations. Group I scaled 291 adjectives and Group II scaled 288 
adjectives, including reliability items.
Raters were required to make two judgments for each adjective, 
one as it applied in a favorable or unfavorable way to men and the 
other as it applied in a favorable or unfavorable way to women. Judg­
ments were made using a nine-point scale where "1" was "very unfavorable" 
and "9" was "very favorable.” One-half the men and women in each group 
rated men first; the other half rated women first.
Scaling Analysis
Only those adjectives which showed no sex biases could be used in 
the memory task since any pre-existent differences would confound inter­
pretation of the results. To determine if men and women rated adjectives 
differently, their responses were analyzed using four different t-tests. 
If a t significant at the .05 level or better was obtained for any ad­
jective on any of the four tests, the adjective was rejected.
Initially, three t-tests using regression analyses were run (for 
a description of this procedure, see Williams, 1974): one between 
males and females in response to the male set, one between males and
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females in response to the female set, and one between males and fe­
males based on the difference scores between male and female sets. 
These analyses identified all adjectives where men and women were 
different in their ratings. They did not identify those adjectives 
which were rated differently when the stimulus set was men than when 
it was women. Therefore, an additional t-test was computed on the 
adjectives remaining after the previous analyses were completed.
This final analysis was based on t = —■L. ~ff.2 where:b°M
= mean of male and female ratings to the male set,
M 2 = mean of male and female ratings to the famale set, and
= standard error of the difference between means obtained 
from the analysis of the difference scores.
For the reliability items where two sets of data were available— one 
rejecting the item and the other failing to reject the item— that 
analysis failing to reject the item was retained. After completion 
of these analyses (repeated items excluded) 161 items remained. Of 
these, five others were randomly rejected since the experimental de­
sign required the number of items in the memory lists to be multiples 
of six. Reliability estimates were computed on ratings of the reli­
ability items for the male set and female set for each subject using 
PM correlations. These correlations were then averaged across male 
subjects and across female subjects to obtain an overall estimate of 
reliability for males and females. The average correlation for males 
was .82 and for females was .81. These average correlations between 
males and females were not significantly different from each other 
(t = 0.037, df « 70).
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Memory Task
Subjects and Subject Selection
The counterbalancing scheme used for the memory task employed 
sixteen variations of the memory lists. To guarantee that one male 
and one female at each of the three categories of responding on the 
AWS received each of the sixteen variations of the memory lists, a 
total of 96 subjects (48 males and 48 females) were required in the 
design. The mean age for male and female subjects, based on incomplete 
data (N for males = 40; N for females = 41), was 24.2 and 22.3 years 
respectively, with an overall mean age of 23.1 years.
The subjects were students enrolled in psychology, sociology, 
economics, English, mathematics, chemistry and humanities classes 
at the University of North Dakota during the 1974 summer session.
Credit for participation was dependent upon the individual's instructor.
II was granted permission from instructors to enter their classes 
and ask for volunteers to participate in a psychological research study. 
Potential volunteers were told that participation would require complet­
ing the AWS which would require approximately twenty minutes of their 
time. (For a description of the AWS the reader is referred to the 
Introduction.) They were further toJd that interpretation of scores 
would be provided by E upon request. Depending upon their questionnaire 
scores (described below) they would be contacted by phone and asked to 
participate in a second, phase of the experiment requiring them to view 
some slides, which would also take approximately twenty minutes. Par­
ticipants in this second phase were debriefed at the conclusion of the 
experiment.
The AWS was administered at the beginning of summer school to 63
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males and 110 females. The mean and standard deviation of scores for 
each sex and for the combined group are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Groups Administered the AWS
Male Female Combined
Group I Group II Group I Group II Group I Group II
X 162.49 173.69 173.69 176.62 168.79 170.60
SD 20.18 30.20 23.22 27.09 22.72 26.83
N 63 58 110 54 173 112
The difference between the means for males and for females was signi-
ficant (t = 3.12; df = 171; £^.01).
The cut-off criteria for inclusion into the liberal (high) and 
conservative (low) categories of the AWS variable were set at 1 SD 
above and below the mean of the combined group. Therefore, any score 
above a critical value of 192 was placed in the high group and any 
score below 146 was placed in the low group. The middle group was 
selected from those scores closest to the mean until the required 
number were obtained (scores ranged from 152-178). The number of 
subjects needed for each level of the AWS variable was not obtained 
with this N so another 112 persons were administered the AWS in the 
manner described previously. The means for these two groups were not 
significantly different (M-[ = 168.79; M2 = 170.60; _t = .61; djf = 283; 




Figure 3. Frequency polygon of mean ratings of adjectives 
occurring in the rating categories.
Table 2
Frequency of Occurrence per Million Words (from Lorge & Thorndike, 1942)
of the Adjectives in the Memory Lists
Frequency per 
Million
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
List A List B Total List A List B Total List A List B Total
1- 5 9 8 17 9 9 18 10 10 20
6-10 3 4 7 4 4 - 8 3 3 7
11-15 3 2 5 1 2 3 3 3 5
16-20 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 2
21-25 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 2
26-30 1 2 3 1 1 2 0 0 1
30-40 2 2 4 2 1 3 1 1 2
40-50 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 2
A* 2 1 3 2 1 3 1 1 2
AA** 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
Unknown 3 4 7 5 4 9 4 4 7
Totals 26 26 52 26 26 52 26 26 52
*50-99 per million.
**100+ per million. ■S'■>
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he had seen that adjective paired with a particular prefix. This 
could erroneously lead one to state that the item was recognized 
because it referred to men, or to women. In order to eliminate this 
potential source of confusion the male and female prefixes were used 
with each adjective. As a result, two subsidiary lists (A2 and B2 ) 
were created simply by using the opposite prefix, i.e., "Women are 
nasty" or "Men are modest." Each statement was then typed onto an 
acetate transparency and placed in a slide frame to be viewed on a 
projection screen. This created four memory lists (old lists) 78 
statements long.
It was necessary to guarantee that the items in each of the 
memory lists appeared in a different order. Also, it was necessary 
to insure that no "strings" of a particular favorability level or 
sex of prefix occurred within the memory lists. To control for these 
factors each list, or deck of frames, was shuffled numerous times and 
then inspected to insure that no favorability level or sex of prefix 
occurred more often than four times in sequence.
Construction of the recognition lists (combined lists) was dif­
ferent from construction of the memory lists. Items comprising the 
recognition lists were typed in double-spaced columns (one column per 
page) on 8 1/2 x 11 inch bond paper. Opposite each item was a rating 
scale for making confidence judgments (see Appendix C). Each recogni­
tion list was a combination of list Aj^  or A2 with list or 8 2 - 
Items within a recognition list were randomly arranged and then read­
justed such that the same favorability level, the same sex of prefix 





The memory task required counterbalancing the presentation of the 
four different lists to randomize any order factors that might affect 
learning and recognition. The counterbalancing scheme is shown below:
The counterbalancing scheme was quite intricate, so, to simplify under­
standing of what was done, the situation involving memory lists Ax and 
Bi will be described.
Twenty-four subjects viewed list Ax as the memory list with one- 
half of these subjects receiving AxBx as the recognition list. However, 
as can be seen from the diagram above, one-half of the subjects viewing 
memory list Bx first received the same recognition list, i.e., Ax com­
bined with Bx» This created a situation where the order of items 
within these recognition lists could produce effects and yield differences 
between the groups of subjects responding to the items. To remedy this 
problem four alternate forms of AxBx were created by arranging the pages 
in the recognition booklet in four different random orders. This guar­
anteed that no group of subjects would receive the same order of items 
on the recognition lists. The same procedure was used for the other 
combinations of lists. Thus, there were four AB combinations each with 
four different arrangements of items.
Procedure
The memory list (old words) was presented by slides using a Kodak 
carousel projector to subjects individually and in groups. Exposure 
time was five seconds per slide. Subjects were given the following in-
Memory lists:
Recognition lists: AxBx AxBx
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structions orally: "You will be presented slides on which are typed 
statements about men and women. Read each statement silently to 
yourself. You will see each slide for five seconds and it will take 
six and one-half minutes to view all the slides. Upon completion of 
viewing, further instructions will be given. Are there any questions?"
Upon completion of viewing the memory items, one minute elapsed 
before the second portion was given. S was then handed a booklet con­
taining the "old" plus "new" list (see Appendix C). were given the 
following oral instructions: "The booklet before you contains state­
ments about men and women, half of which you have seen before and half 
which are new. You are to indicate, using the scale from 1 to 6 oppo- 
site each statement, your confidence that the statement is one you 
have seen before. A "1" means you are very confident it is an old 
statement and a "6" means you are very confident it is a new statement. 
Be sure to read the instructions at the top of the page before you 
begin. Start with the first statement on the first page and follow 
in sequence, doing the first page, then the second, and so on. Do 
not skip any items. It will take about twenty minutes. You may leave 
when you finish. Are there any questions? Begin!"
Data Analysis
The dependent variables for this analysis were d', beta, and per­
cent correct. The cumulative proportions of hits and false alarms for 
each rating category were determined for each subject at each favor- 
ability level for male and female statements. The values of d’ and 
beta computed from the cumulative proportions of hits and false alarms 
were those based on a 2 x 2 decision matrix divided between the third 
and fourth confidence categories. The percent correct was the number
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of hits plus correct rejections from the decision matrix described 
above, divided by the total number of observations (0 = 2j) for each 
favorability level for male and female statements. An arc sine 
transformation was required for the percent correct values.
The design was a 4-way analysis of variance with the independent 
variables being sex of subject, attitude towards women category (high, 
middle, low), sex of statement, and favorability of statement (Level 1, 
Level 2, Level 3). Sex of subject and attitude towards women category 
were between subject variables; sex of statement and favorability of 
statement were within subject variables (repeated measures). A sepa­
rate analysis was run for each dependent variable.





The means for the overall 4-way analysis of varianie for each 
of the three dependent variables— percent correct, d', and ft —  
are shown in Table 3. The results obtained for each dependent 
variable will be presented separately.
Percent Correct
The analysis for percent correct yielded no differences for sex 
of subject, sex of statement (stem), or for any interaction of the 
four variables as shown in Table 4. However, there were significant 
effects for AWS category (j)<.05) and for favorability of item 
(2 . ^ .01). The means for the effect due to AWS category are plotted 
in Figure 4.
A Neuman-Keuls analysis yielded only one significant difference, 
that between the middle and high AWS categories (£.<.05). For the 
memory task, this means that men and women who were liberal in their 
attitude towards women correctly recognized more items than did men 
and women who scored in the middle range on the AWS. The low AWS 
group (those subjects who were the most conservative in their attitude 
towards women) also tended to correctly recognize more items than the 
middle group, but this comparison failed to reach significance.
The main effect for favorability is plotted in Figure 5. Internal 
comparisons using Neuman-Keuls procedure yielded significant comparisons
Table 3
Mean Percent Correct, d' and Beta for Sex of Subject, AWS Category, 











di 3 cn <C % d’ f % d* $ % d’ % d’ % d’ f % d' CV/c d'
Hi .73 1.50 1.51 .73 1.54 2.53 .74 1.68 3.34 .72 1.33 .96 .76 1.66 1.72 .76 1.71 3.73 .74 1.57 2.30
^ Med .61 .70 .88 .69 1.32 1.80 .67 1.08 1.88 .61 .73 .94 .69 1.09 1.01 .72 1.43 3.09 .67 1.06 1.60
Lo .69 1.29 1.51 .73 1.46 1.86 .75 1.68 1.93 .69 1.34 1.58 .70 1.24 2.32 .73 1.42 .96 .71 1.41 1.69
Hi<U .68 1.21 2.87 .74 1.57 3.58 .76 1.76 3.50 .71 1.29 1.70 .78 1.88 2.53 .75 1.62 2.06 .73 1.55 2.71
tH
gMed0) .62 .72 .93 .64 .85 1.23 .70 1.19 1.55 .62 .70 1.22 .68 1.12 2.05 .63 .79 .94 .65 .90 1.32
Lo .64 .85 .99 .67 1.07 1.95 .68 1.34 3.43 .67 1.00 1.07 .69 1.30 3.15 .70 1.36 3.03 .68 1.15 2.27




Source Table for Percent Correct
Source DF Mean Squares F P
Sex 1 552.247 0.731
AWS 2 3091.230 4.092 0.020
Sex X AWS 2 109.536 0.145
Unit 90 755.475
Stem 1 50.175 0.583
Sex X Stem 1 18.777 0.218
AWS X Stem 2 25.210 C. 293
Sex X AWS X Stem 2 148.076 1.663
Stem X Unit 90 86.046
Favorability 2 1333.510 14.913 0.001
Sex X Favorability 2 9.599 0.107
AWS X Favorability 4 55.318 0.619
Sex X AWS X Favorability 4 94.943 1.062
Favorability X Unit 180 89.417
Stem X Favorability 2 28.262 0.433
Sex X Stem X Favorability 2 166.480 2.551 0.081
AWS X Stem X Favorability 
Sex X AWS X Stem X Favor-
4 18.142 0.278
ability




Figure 4. Means for AWS category main effect for percent
correct.
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Least Favorable Most Favorable
Favorability Level
Figure 5. Means for favorability main effect for percent 
correct.
between levels 1 and 2 and between levels 1 and 3 (jg. ^  -01 for both 
comparisons). This indicates that men and women tended to recognize 
more accurately items which were more favorable descriptors of 
people than items which were less favorable.
cT
The results for d* were essentially the same as those for percent 
correct. There were no differences in d* as a function of sex of sub­
ject or sex of stem or for any interaction of the four variables. 
However, there were significant differences due to AWS category 
(j>«< .05) and favorability of item as shown in Table 5. The means for 
the AWS main effect.are plotted in Figure 6. A Neuman-Keuls analysis 
indicated that the only significant comparison occurred between the 
high and middle group (j><.05). This difference suggests that men 
and women who are liberal in their attitudes toward women remembered
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Source Table for d'
Table 5
Source DF Mean Squares F
Sex 1 29799.086 0.791
AWS 2 164233.813 4.359
Sex X AWS 2 5769.730 0.180
Unit 90 37673.844
Stem 1 174.464 0.038
Sex X Stem 1 2769.339 0.599
AWS X Stem 2 252.737 0.055
Sex X AWS X Stem 2 4366.719 0.944
Stem X Unit 90 4637.082
Favorability 2 71009.750 14.806
Sex X Favorability 2 1246.698 0.260
AWS X Favorability 3 2600.470 0.542
Sex X AWS X Favorability 3 3735.000 0.779
Favorability X Unit 180 4796.145
Stem X Favorability 2 2678.258 0.714
Sex X Stem X Favorability 2 10807.984 2.879
AWS X Stem X Favorability 4 1519.894 0.432
Sex X AWS X Stem X Favor-
ability 4 4107.655 1.094









Figure 6. Means for AWS main effect for d'.
more statements about men and women than did men and women who are 
less extreme in their attitudes towards women. The conservative 
subjects also tendea to remember more statements than the middle 
group but not significantly so.
The means for the favorability main effect for d' are graphed 
in Figure 7. Neuman-Keuls comparisons between levels 1 and 2 and 
levels 1 and 3 were significant (j>^:.01). These differences indicate 
that items which were the least favorable descriptions of men and 
women were the most difficult to remember in the recognition task.
Beta
The analysis for beta is shown in Table 6. There were no dif­
ferences in subject's criteria, or response bias (which beta measures), 
as a function of subject sex, AWS category, or as a function of the sex
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Favorability Level
Figure 7. Means for favorability main effect for d'.
of stem. There was a significant main effect for favorability (]3-c . 01) 
and for the Sex X AWS X Favorability interaction ( £ <  .05), as shown in 
Table 6.
The main effect for favorability is shown in Figure 8. A Neuman- 
Keuls comparison yielded significant differences between levels 1 and 
2 and levels 1 and 3 ( £ <  .01 for both comparisons). This indicates 
that as the items became more favorable, men and women tended to deny 
having seen the item before more often than when the item was more 
unfavorable, that is, they became less risky in their responding. If 
one compares thas result with that for d', it becomes apparent that 
the bias to say "No" was related to increased accuracy in remembering 
the items. It should also be. pointed out that the means for the three 
levels of favorability are all above 1.00 indicating an overall bias 
to respond "no" to the memory items.
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Table 6
Source Table for Beta
Source DF Mean Square F P
Sex 1
AWS 2
Sex X AWS 2
Unit 90
Stem 1
Sex X Stem 1
AWS X Stem 2
Sex X AWS X Stem 2
Stem X Unit 90
Favorability 2
Sex X Favorability 2
AWS X Favorability 3
Sex X AWS X Favorability 3
Favorability X Unit 180
Stem X Favorability 2
Sex X Stem X Favorability 2 
AWS X Stem X Favorability 4 
Sex X AWS X Stem X Favor­
ability 4
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Figure 8. Graph of favorability main effect for beta.
The interaction effect is shown in Figure 9. A Tukey HSD test 
for pairs of means yielded one significant comparison— that between 
high AWS males at level 3 and low AWS males at level 1 (j) «e .05).
The interaction shows that, for high and middle AWS males and low 
AWS females, (j tended to increase in value (meaning these subjects 
adopted stricter criteria and increased their frequency of "no" re­
sponses) as the items became more favorable; but, with low AWS males 
as well as high and middle AWS females, $ tended to decrease (meaning 










Figure 9. The Sex of Subject X AWS X Favorability interaction
for beta.
"yes" responses) for the level 3 (most favorable) Items in comparison 
to the level 2 items. These subjects adopted essentially the same 
criteria for the least favorable and the most favorable items. The 
information provided by this interaction, however, is too complicated 





Overall, the results showed that subjects who were liberal in 
their attitudes toward women recognized more items than subjects who 
were moderate in their attitudes toward women. The results further 
showed that all subjects tended to recognize favorable items jore 
frequently than less favorable items. A consistent bias to deny 
having seen items before was found and was related to an increased 
accuracy in recognizing items.
The hypothesis that women would remember more statements than 
men was not confirmed. Iu fact, the direction of the difference 
favored men. It should be pointed out that the subjects, drawn from 
a summer school enrollment, were probably different in several respects 
from subjects in other studies where sex differences have been reported. 
Summer school enrollments typically consist of a larger proportion of 
older students and teachers returning for further instruction. The 
approximate mean age of the present sample was 23.2 years (refer to 
section entitled "Subjects and Subject Selection"). Most studies 
have reported differences favoring women using subjects in the age 
range seven to eighteen years. Female superiority in verbal memory 
which occurs during the grade school and high school years may dis­
appear as males and females get older. The persistence of this dif­
ference has seldom been investigated beyond the early college years
and may actually balance out between the sexes with age. Further 
investigations with older subjects are needed.
The differential performance by men and women with same sex 
and opposite sex stimuli which has been found in other memory studies, 
modelling studies, and studies on person perception was not found in 
the present study. A relevant factor, here, is the different nature 
of the task used in this study in comparison to the tasks used in 
other studies. Most often attitudinally biased statements written 
into a meaningful prose passage have been used. When the memory 
task has consisted of separate statements, these have usually been 
a small number of sentences provided by E or generated by the subject 
rather than consisting of a long list of items. The present study 
utilized a long list repeating two sentence stems, men and women, but 
each adjective was different for each stem for a given subject. The 
repetition of only two stems could easily have induced boredom and 
led to subjects attending only to "new" input, i.e., the adjective 
in each case, and not linking the stem and the adjective. Subjects 
would then have been remembering adjectives rather than statements 
about men and women.
From a theoretical point of view an attitude may not be a single 
dimension. Insko & Schopler (cited in Wrightsman, 1972) described 
three components of an attitude: cognitive, affective, and conative. 
The cognitive component is fact oriented, the affective component 
refers to emotional feelings (liking and disliking), and the conative 
component emphasizes how a person responds. In an experimental 
setting where the cognitive component of an attitude predominated, 
subjects might be more likely to respond in terms of the truth of 
falseness of a statement (e.g., to "Men are dumb" they respond "That'
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not true") rather than in terms of liking or disliking the statement 
(e.g., to "Men are dumb" they respond "I like that"). It can not be 
readily ascertained that subjects in this experiment were predominantly 
involved with a cognitive as opposed to an affective component, but, 
it seems a probable assumption to make since the task lends itself 
more readily to reactions in terms of true or false rather than in 
terms of liking or disliking the statements. If, by changing the 
instructions or manipulating the experimental situation, the affective 
component of the attitude investigated in this study were made to 
predominate, differential memory for male and female statements 
might have been induced. In other words, men and women may remember 
male and female statements differently if they are reacting to them 
in terms of liking or disliking the statements rather than in terms 
of their truth or falseness. Further research could test this using 
two different instruction conditions when the memory lists are presented.
The hypothesis that attitude toward women would differentially 
affect memory for favorable, neutral, or unfavorable statements about 
men and women was supported in part. Attitudes did make a difference 
in retention between subjects who were liberal in their attitudes 
and those who were moderate, the moderates doing more poorly. There 
was no evidence of differential recognition by men and women of value­
laden statements about men and women, however, which would have been 
more solid support for selective retention. There is no obvious 
reason for subjects with moderate attitudes towards womens' roles 
in society to recognize fewer statements than liberal or conservative 
subjects. One possibility, however, might be that this middle group 
tended to be less ego-involved in the task than the other two groups.
In this sense, ego-involvement is synonymous with interest or what
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Taft (1954) referred to as an "intensity factor."
This may help explain why moderates remembered fewer items than 
liberals and conservatives but it is likewise appropriate to offer 
an explanation of liberal subjects remembering more items than the 
other two groups. It is recalled that Miller & Bacon (1971) showed 
open-minded subjects to be faster in recognizing stimulus elements 
than close-minded subjects. Liberal subjects in the present study 
may have been more open-minded and, on a timed task, processed more 
information and remembered that information better than moderate and 
conservative subjects. The liberal-conservative distinction tends 
to be quite similar to the open-minded and close-minded distinction 
made by Miller & Bacon.
The results on item favorability showed that favorable items 
were recognized more frequently than unfavorable items. The tendency 
to remember favorable stimuli was also found by Taft (1954). It 
seems probable that, on the whole, people remember favorable statements 
better than unfavorable ones. Kanungo and Dutta (1966) have shown, 
with pleasant and unpleasant adjectives, that more pleasant than 
unpleasant adjectives are recalled when ascribed to one's own group. 
However, as there was no differential recognition due to sex of stem, 
subjects in the present study were not responding in terms of any 
reference group; rather, they were responding in terms of some more 
"general" frame of reference. This seems to suggest that people 
remember information which is positive and more socially desirable.
The results for indicated an overall tendency for subjects to 
respond with a bias which denied having seen items before. However, 
with favorable items this bias was even more apparent than with 
unfavorable items. Subjects adopted a stricter criterion and were more
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confident in their responses to the favorable items. This was related 
to an increased accuracy in the recognition of items, which, although 
theoretically possible since d' and are independent, is confusing.
No explanation of this result is offered.
In conclusion, TSD has shown its applicability in testing the 
selective retention hypothesis. It has raised a disturbing question 
in its application to attitude research, however, in the nature of the 
relationship which occurred between recognition accuracy and adoption 
of a negative response bias. It is not apparent if this relationship 
occurred because of problems inherent in the measurement of d' and ^  
or if it is a truly valid phenomena pertinent to selective retention.
It is possible that if subjects were bored with the task, that this 
subjective state could lead to a shift in criterion such that only 
statements which the subjects were absolutely sure of were reported 
as ones seen before. This would practically eliminate false alarms 
and produce large values for . Another problem which remains pertains 
to the statements themselves. The ratings of the adjectives were skewed 
in the unfavorable direction. It could be that the favorable items 
were so different from the unfavorable items that identifying them was 
like spotting red dots amongst white ones. Further applications of 
TSD in selective retention studies will be needed to find solutions 
to some of these problems.
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The statements listed below describe attitudes toward the role of 
women in society which different people have. There are no right 
or wrong answers, only opinions. You are asked to express your 
feelings about each statement by indicating whether you (1) Agree 
strongly, (2) Agree mildly, (3) Disagree mildly, or (4) Disagree 
strongly. Please indicate your opinion by marking the column on 
the answer sheet which corresponds to the alternative which best 
describes your personal attitude. Please respond to every item.
(1) Agree strongly (2) Agree mildly (3) Disagree mildly (4) Dis­
agree strongly.
1. Women have an obligation to be faithful to their husbands.
2. Swearing and obscenity is more repulsive in the speech of a woman 
than a man.
3. The satisfaction of her husband’s sexual desires is a fundamental 
obligation of every wife.
4. Divorced men should help support their children but should not be 
required to pay alimony if their wives are capable of working.
5. Under ordinary circumstances, men should be expected to pay all 
the expenses while they’re out on a date.
6. Women should take increasing responsibility for leadership in 
solving the intellectual and social problems of the day.
7. It is alright for wives to have an occasional, casual, extramarital 
affair.
8. Special attentions like standing up for a woman who comes into a 
room or giving her a seat on a crowded bus are outmoded and should 
be discontinued.
9. Vocational and professional schools should admit the best qualified 
students, independent of sex.
10. Both husbaud and wife should be allowed the same grounds for divorce.
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11. Telling dirty jokes should be mostly a masculine prerogative.
12. Husbands and wives should be equal partners in planning the 
family budget.
13. Men should continue to show courtesies to women such as holding 
open the door or helping them on with their coats.
14. Women should claim alimony not as persons incapable of self- 
support but only when there are children to provide for or when 
the burden of starting life anew after the divorce is obviously 
heavier for the wife.
15. Intoxication among women is worse than intoxication among men.
16. The initiative in dating should come from the man.
17. Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside 
the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing 
dishes and doing the laundry.
18. It is insulting to women to have the "obey" clause remain in the 
marriage service.
19. There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and pro­
motion without regard to sex.
20. A woman should be as free as a man to propose marriage.
21. Parental authority and responsibility for discipline of the children 
should be equally divided between husband and wife.
22. Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming 
good wives and mothers.
23. Women earning as much as their dates should bear equally the ex­
pense whey they go out together.
24. Women should assume their rightful place in business and all the 
professions along with men.
25. A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places or to 
have quite the pare freedom of action as a man.
26. Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to 
college than daughters.
27. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive and for a man to 
darn socks.
28. It is childish for a woman to assert herself by retaining her 
maiden name after marriage.
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29. Society should regard the services rendered by the women workers 
as valuable as those of men.
30. It is only fair that male workers should receive more pay than 
women even for identical work.
31. In general, the father should have greater authority than the 
mother in bringing up of children.
32. Women should be encouraged not to become sexually intimate with 
anyone before marriage, even their fiances.
33. Women should demand money for household and personal expenses as 
a right rather than as a gift.
34. The husband should not be favored by law over the wife in the 
disposal of family property or income.
35. Wifely submission is an outwarn virtue.
36. There are some professions and types of businesses that are more 
suitable for men than women.
37. Women should be concerned with their duties of childrearing and 
housetending, rather than with desires for professional and 
business careers.
38. The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in 
the hands of men.
39. A wife should make every effort to minimize irritation and incon­
venience to the male head of the family.
40. There should be no greater barrier to an unmarried woman having 
sex with a casual acquaintance than having dinner with him.
41. Economic and social freedom is worth far more to women than ac­
ceptance of the ideal of femininity which has been set by men.
42. Women should take the passive role in courtship.
43. On the average, women should be regarded as less capable of con­
tribution to economic production than are men.
44. The intellectual equality of women with men is perfectly obvious.
45. Women should have full control of their persons and give or with­
hold sex intimacy as they choose.
46. The husband has in general no obligation to inform his wife of 
his financial plans.
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47. There are many jobs in which men should be given preference over 
women in being hired or promoted.
48. Women with children should not work outside the home if they 
don't have to financially.
49. Women should be given equal opportunity with men for apt entice- 
ship in the various trades.
50. The relative amounts of time and energy to be devoted to house­
hold duties on the one hand and to a career on the other should 
be determined by personal desires and interest? rather than by 
sex.
51. As head of the household, the husband should have more responsi­
bility for the family's financial plans than his wife.
52. If both husband and wife agree that sexual fidelity isn't impor­
tant, there's no reason why both nouldn't have extramarital 
affairs if they want to.
53. The husband should be regarded as the legal representative of the 
family group in all matters of law.
54. The modern girl is entitled to the same freedom from regulation 
and control that is given to the modern boy.
55. Most women need and want the kind of protection and support that 
men have traditionally given them.
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APPENDIX B
Male and Female Description Form I
Circle
Your Sex M F
Instructions: Below are adjectives which may be used in describing 
people. Use the scales opposite each word to indicate the extent 
to which you feel an adjective is "favorable" or "unfavorable" as 
it applies to men and to women.
Each scale ranges from "1" (very unfavorable) to "9" (very 
favorable). Indicate your judgment of an adjective's favorability 
by circling an appropriate number on each of the male and female 
scales. Remember that we are asking only for your judgment. There 
are no right or wrong answers.







abnormal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
accepting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
adaptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
adorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
witty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
alert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wasteful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
alluring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ambitious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
annoying 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
apathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Men Women
very very very very
unfavorable favorable unfavorable favorable
appreciative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 0J 4 5 6 7 8 9
stable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
artificial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
attractive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
arrogant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
analytical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
awkward *»-L 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
bashful 1 2 3 4 5 6 ” 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
bewildering 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
boastful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
bossy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
panicky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
brave 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
brilliant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
casual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
changeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
obstructive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
clever 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
commanding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
conceited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sensitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
conformist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Men Women
very very very very
unfavorable favorable unfavorable favorable
conscientious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
congenial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
considerate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
contented 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
teasers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
conventional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
corrupt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
courteous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
crabby 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unyielding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
creative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
crooked 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cruel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cunning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
superficial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cynical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
daring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dutiful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
delightful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 9 5 6 7 8 9
decent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dependable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tidy 1 2 3 / .T 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
determined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
devout 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Men Women
very very very very
disgraceful
unfavorable 
1 2  3 4 5
favorable 
6 7 8 9
unfavorable 
1 2  3 4 5
favorable 
6 7 8 9
dull 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dynamic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unafraid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 ”7/ 8 9
egotistical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
enchanting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
enjoyable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
perplexing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
evasive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
excellent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
expert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
expressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fakers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sickening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
faithful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fantastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fashionable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fearful 1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fickle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
snobs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fine 1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
firm 1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
flexible 1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Men Women
very very very very-
unfavorable favorable unfavorable favorable
followers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 r\O 9
formal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
normal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
forgetful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
frank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fun 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
gallant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
puzzling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
gentle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
gifted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
good 1 2 *■»Jr 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
greedy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
grateful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
relaxed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
groovy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
gutty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
haggard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
handy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hardy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
rigid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hasty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
haughty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
healthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
heavenly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Men Women
very very Very very
unfavorable favorable unfavorable fr, vo r able
hideous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 U 7 8 9
scholarly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hopeless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hostile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
human 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
humorous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
practical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hysterical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
idiotic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
imaginative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
imitators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 - 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
immoral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hardy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
impulsive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Incoherent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9
inconsiderate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
indecisive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
indifferent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
individualistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ineffective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Influential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
inquisitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
insightful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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very very very very
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appreciativ<2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9
intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
intimate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
intuitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
introspective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
irritable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
alert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
jerks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
jolly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
joyful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
juvenile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fickle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
kiddish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
knowledgeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
large 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lazy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lenient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fakers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
liars 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lively 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
logical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lovely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lucky 1 2 •yJ 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
bossy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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manipulative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
materialistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
meddlesome 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mellow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
merciful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
changeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mischievous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
misguided 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
monotonous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
musical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
conceited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mysterious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
naive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
naughty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
neat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
negligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
contented 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
neurotic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
noble 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
natural 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9
nonchalant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 71 8 9
normal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9
notorious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
obj ective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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punctual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
puzzling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dependable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
quick 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
radical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
reactionary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 1 0£. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
rebellious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
relaxed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
insightful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
religious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
repulsive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
respectable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
rigid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
merciful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
rough 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
rude 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ruthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sarcastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
scholarly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lenient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
scoundrels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
seclusive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
secure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9






1 2  3 4 5
very
favorable 
6 7 8 9
very
unfavorable 
1 2  3 4 5
very
favorable 
6 7 8 9
obsessed 1 :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
obstructive l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
crabby 1 :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
offensive 1 :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
optimistic l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
orderly l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
outgoing l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
panicky l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cynical L :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
passionate 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
patient ]. :2 3 4 5 6 "7» 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
peaceable i :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
perfectlonistic :i :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1JL 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
perplexing 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
enthusiastic 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
persuasive L :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
pests l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
pleasant i :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
physical l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
practical l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dynamic l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
predictable l :tU 3 4 3 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
provocative l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
political l :2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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sensitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
immoral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
serious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
shallow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sharp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
shrewd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sickening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
indifferent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
skeptical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sloppy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
smart 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
snobs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
musical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
soft 3. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
spirited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
spoiled 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
spunky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
stable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
humorous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
stimulating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
stingy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
stubborn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sulky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
superficial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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formal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
surprising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
stupid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 3. 2 3 4 5 6 / 8 9
sympathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
talkative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
teasers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lucky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tempermental \ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 3 6 / 8 9
terrible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
thoughtful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 / 8 9
threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tidy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
negligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tiresome 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
touchy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
treacherous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 *7/ 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unafraid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hideous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unbearable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
uncivilized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unfeeling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unyielding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
irritable 1 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
vibrant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
vicious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
vulgar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wasteful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
juvenile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wearisome 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
whacky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wholesome 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
witty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 nZ. 3 A 5 6 7 8 9
gallant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Male and Female Description Form II
Circle
Your Sex M F
Instructions; Below are adjectives which may be used in describing 
people. Use the scales opposite each word to indicate the extent to 
which you feel an adjective is "favorable" or "unfavorable" as it 
applies to men and to women. Each scale ranges from "1" (very un­
favorable) to "9" (very favorable). Indicate your judgment of an 
adjective's favorability by circling an appropriate number on each 
of the male and female scales. Remember that we are asking only for 
your judgment. There are no right or wrong answers.
Please do not leave any items blank.
Men Women
very very very very
unfavorable favorable unfavorable favorable
abusive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
active 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
admirable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
afraid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
aggrevating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
superb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
aloof 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
amusing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
articulate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
artistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
athletic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
vain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
assertive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
argumentative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
affectionate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
aware 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
barbaric 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
beautiful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
bitter j 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
bold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
brainy j 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
savage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
brooding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
capable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
brutal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
careful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cautious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
observant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
charming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
childish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
comical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
committed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
permissive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
compulsive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
conservative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
contrary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
controlling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
coordinated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cordial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
90
Men Women
very very very very
unfavorable favorable unfavorable favorable
courageous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sensible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
crazy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
crude 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cuddly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
curious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
powerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dangerous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dirty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
decisive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
deceitful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
defensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ornery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
destructive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
devious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
different 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
domineering 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dumb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
eccentric 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
noisy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
eager 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
emotional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
energetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
enterprising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
enticing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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pushy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
evil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
excitable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
exhibitionists: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fabulous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
reckless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fanatical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fascinating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
faultless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
feeble 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
filthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sociable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
flabby 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
flighty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
silly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
forceful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
foxy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
timid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fragile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
frightening i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
fussy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
generous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
aggravating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9











favorablegloomy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
goofy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
grouchy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
guarded 1 2 3 4 5 6 / 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
artistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
habitual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
handicapped 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 9 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
harsh 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hateful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
aware 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
headstrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
reserved 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
heartless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
holy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
honorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
horrible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
brainy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hospitable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 £> 7 8 9
humble 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
hypocritical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
idealistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ignorant 1 2 ' 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cautious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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immaculate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
impressionable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
indecent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
independent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
indirect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
industrious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
inferior 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wild 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
inhibited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
insecure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
inspiring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
interesting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
intolerable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wicked 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Introverted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
inventive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
irresistable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
jealous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
taunting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
jovial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
jubilant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
keen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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kind 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
committed 1 2 3 4 5 6 n/ 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lawful 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lethargic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
liberated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
filthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
lousy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
loyal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mannerly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
enticing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mediocre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
menacing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mighty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
miserable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
modest 1 2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
moody 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mousey 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mushy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
naggy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
nasty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
defensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
nauseous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
neglectful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
nice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 c 6 7 8 9
noisy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
eccentric 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
nonsensical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
nosy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
obedient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
obnoxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
observant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
contrary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
obstinate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
odd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
opinionated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
original 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ornery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
outspoken 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
paranoid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
peculiar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
permissive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
curious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
persistent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
pessimistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
pitiful x 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
phony 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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1 2  3 4 5 6
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scornful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
screwy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
secretive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
seductive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sensible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
horrible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 / 8 9
sentimental 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sexy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sharing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
shifty 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
shy j 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
silly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ignorant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
skillful X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
slow j 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sneaky X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sociable i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sophisticated j 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
incompetent ][ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
splendid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
spontaneous x 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sporty i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
guarded X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
stern X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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strict 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
strong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
submissive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
suggestible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
superb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
superstitious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
suspicious 1 2 3 4 5 6 -> 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sweet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tactful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
taunting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
technical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
theoretical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
thrilling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
thrifty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
timid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
nasty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tolerant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tough 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 8 7 8 9
tricky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
truthful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unbiased 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
understandable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unlucky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unresponsive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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vain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
mature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
versatile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
violent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
vigorous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
modest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
weird 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
whiny 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
willing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wicked 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
wild 1 2 3 4 3 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
withdrawn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9




Half of the statements below were presented earlier. Indicate by 
circling the appropriate number on the scale opposite each statement 
your certainty the statement is old (one you have seen before) or new 
(one you have not seen before). A "1" means you are "very certain" it 
is old and a "6 " means you are "very certain" it is new. Sometimes 
you will be more certain than others. Circle the number which most
accurately represents how certain you are. For examp .1a, if you are
uncertain it is old you might circle a "3." If you are uncertain it










Men are immature 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are miserable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are idiotic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are deceitful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are repulsive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are manipulative 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are respectable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are cruel 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are abusive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are destructive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are eccentric 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are kiddish 1 2 3 4 5 6










Women are sarcastic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are fanatical 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are juvenile 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are greedy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are vicious 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are vain 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are bossy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are lousy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are aggravating 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are reckless 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are frightening 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are argumentative 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are peculiar 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are forceful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are immoral 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are unyielding 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are jealous 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are hypocritical 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are formal 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are analytical 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are obstructive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are pitiful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are intolerable 1 2 3 4 5 6











Women are wild 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are offensive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are ruthless 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are devout 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are prejudiced 1 2 3 4 5 6
W 'men are artificial 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are harsh 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are neglectful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are screwy 1 2 3 A 5 6
Men are flabby 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are domineering 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are defensive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are seclusive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are quarrelsome 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are pushy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are tricky 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are devious 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are cold 1 2 o 4 5 6
Men are unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are hideous 1 2 3 4 5 6









Women are apathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are ornery 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are quiet 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are abnormal 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are unfeeling 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are mad 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are foxy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are heartless 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are naggy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are permissive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are exhibitionistic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are lenient 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are neurotic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are grouchy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are groovy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are hasty 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are taunting 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are weird 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are contrary 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are rude 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are forgetful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are sulky 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are sickening 1 2 3 4 5 6










Men are haggard 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are crabby 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are brutal 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are alluring 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are modest 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are ignorant 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are wicked 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are scornful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are crooked 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are rebellious 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are persistent 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are disgraceful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are annoying 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are obsessed 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are monotonous 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are aloof 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are horrible 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are spoiled 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are shallow 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are wasteful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are evil 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are suspicious 1 2 3 4 5 6









Women are indifferent 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are savage 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are lazy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are assertive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are unbiased 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are pessimistic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are misguided 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are stingy 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are dumb 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are dutiful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are outspoken 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are humble 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are phony 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are fickle 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are cynical 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are odd 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are inconsiderate 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are witty 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are uncivilized 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are terrible 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are nauseous 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are evasive 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are obnoxious 1 2 3 4 5 6










Women are materialistic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are shrewd 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are dull 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are lethargic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are nasty 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are bitter 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are unbearable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are treacherous 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are nonsensical 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are stupid 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are bashful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are superficial 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are headstrong 1 2 3 4 5 6
Men are wonderful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are conceited 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women are violent 1 2 3 4 5 6
